University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

1964

The Federal Trade Commission and the Public
Interest
John D. French

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
French, John D., "The Federal Trade Commission and the Public Interest" (1964). Minnesota Law Review. 1638.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1638

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

539

The Federal Trade Commission
and the Public Interest
The language of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act provides that the Commission should act
to prevent unfair competition when such a proceeding
"would be to the interest of the public." This article
concerns the necessity of adherence to the public interest
limitation in light of the heavy proceduraland substantive burdens that Commission proceedings usually impose upon private litigants. Interference in essentially
private disputes, the issuance of ineffective Commission
orders, and the imposition of great harm upon individual
respondents incommensurate with their misdeeds and
in the face of only a remote possibility of any public
injury raise the likelihood of undesirable consequences
from unnecessary Commission action. The author contends that continued proper recognition of this jurisdictional requirement can prevent inflexible Commission
action which, untempered by any "rule of reason," could
produce resultswhich in reality are adverse to the public
interest.

John D. French*
I.
The Federal Trade Commission Act empowers the Commission to issue a complaint when it has reason to suspect the use
of an unfair method of competition or unfair or deceptive act
or practice in commerce, "if it shall appear to the commission
that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would be to the interest
of the public."- The purpose of this paper is to consider the significance of this enigmatic public-interest clause.
Two fundamental propositions will be taken as given. First,
the public-interest clause places a limitation of some sort upon
the authority of the Commission to commence an adjudicative
proceeding. Second, the question whether the Commission has
stayed within the bounds of that limitation is subject to judicial
review.
*Member of the Minnesota and the District of Columbia Bars.
1. Section 5, as amended, 52 Stat. 112 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1958)
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The truth of these propositions will be assumed for two reasons. The first, and most important from a practical viewpoint,
is that they accurately reflect the law as it has stood for 36 years
2 In Klesner, Mr.
since its initial enunciation in FTC v. Klesner?
Justice Brandeis announced that "to justify filing a complaint the
public interest must be specific and substantial."' If the facts
establish that this requirement is not satisfied, the Commission
should dismiss the complaint; if the Commission neglects this
duty, the reviewing court should dismiss the Commission's suit
for enforcement of its order.4
There is considerable evidence that the interpretation placed
on the public-interest clause in Klesser was not in accord with the
intent of the draftsmen of section 5, and the decision has not
gone uncriticized.? On the other hand, as Judge Friendly recently
pointed out, Mr. Justice Brandeis, the author of the opinion,
"'more than any other man, was the begetter' of the Federal
Trade Commission."8 Further, his result in Klesner coincided with
the views of Gerard Henderson, the early leading student of the
Commission.7 In addition, the Court reached its decision in the
face of several clearly known, contrary lower court decisions.8
Of still greater importance, the public-interest propositions
advanced in Klesner have stood the test of time. Later decisions
have confirmed the view that the public-interest clause is a jurisdictional limitation.' Fundamental statutory amendment has left
it unimpaired. 0 The Commission itself has agreed that the clause
places a judicially reviewable limitation on its authority." Recent
2. 280 U.S. 19 (1929).
3. Id. at 28.
4. Id. at So.
5. See, e.g., Note, 48 HARv. L. REv.

285 (1929).

6. Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869, 877 (2d Cir. 1961) (dissenting opinion), quoting in part from MASON, BRANDEis: A FREE MAN'S
LnF 402 (1946).
7. HENDERSON,

THE FEDERAL

TRADE CoMMIssIoN 228-29 (1924).

8. See Moir v. FTC, 12 F.2d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 1926); Hills Bros. v. FTC, 9
F.2d 481, 488 (9th Cir. 1926). Both cases were cited by Commission counsel
to the Court in Kleer.Brief for Petitioner, p. 45, FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S.
19 (1929).
9. American Airlines, Inc. v. North American Airlines, Inc., 851 U.S. 79,
88 (1956); FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 216 (1938); FTC v. Raladam Co., 288 U.S. 648, 648-49 (1931).
10. See Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 Fad 869, 876 (2d Cir. 1961)
(Friendly, J., dissenting); Wheeler-Lea Amendment of 1988, 52 Stat. 111, 15
U.S.C. § 45(b) (1958).
11. See, e.g., Premier Pillow Corp., 52 F.T.C. 1417-19 (1956); Florida
Citrus Mutual, 50 F.T.C. 959, 961, 971 (1954).
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Supreme Court decisions have cited Klesner with approval,2 and
it can fairly be said that no subsequent decision of the Court has
questioned its authority.?2 Thus, to repeat, by virtue of Klesner
and its progeny, the two preliminary assumptions of this inquiry
are the law.
The second reason for accepting these assumptions is that
they are "good" law in the sense that it is more desirable than
not that they be followed. Even at the time of its decision, the
substantive opinions expressed in Klesner squared with the congressional view that the Commission should not waste its time
arbitrating petty personal squabbles.14 Subsequent developments,
discussed at length below, have brought to light other sound
reasons for approving the general significance which the Court
there attached to the public-interest clause.
II.
Although 36 years have passed since the existence of public
interest in an FTC proceeding was first recognized as a jurisdictional question, the scope and content of the clause remain substantially undefined. After Klesner's initial reverberations the
courts have gradually become less strict in their interpretation of
the requirement. A number of decisions can be read without distortion to suggest that the public interest in the prohibition of
any deceptive practice or unfair method of competition is sufficient to justify a Commission proceeding?" This line of authority
12. Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211-19, n.4 (1959);
American Airlines, Inc., v. North American Airlines, Inc., 351 U.S. 79, 83
(1956).
13. The reliance of the court in Northern Feather Works, Inc. v. FTC,
284 F.ad 385, 388 (3d Cir. 1956), on the American Airlines case, supra note 12,
as weakening the public-interest requirement is clearly erroneous in view of
the extended discussion in American Airlines of Klesner and the other publicinterest cases. See text accompanying notes 24-25 infra. The statement in
American Airlines that a finding of public interest "is not a prerequisite to
the issuance of a cease and desist order as such," 851 U.S. at 83, is followed
by the statement that "consideration of the public interest is made a condition upon the assumption of jurisdiction by the agency to investigate trade
practices and methods of competition and determine whether or not they are
unfair." Ibid. In other words, the public interest is not a prerequisite to
issuance of an order "as such," not because the Commission may disregard
the public-interest clause, but because it must treat the presence of public
interest as a prerequisite to commencing a proceeding.
14. See 51 CONG. Ruc. 14930 (1914).
15. E.g., Keller v. FTC, 132 Fd 59, 61 (7th Cir. 1942); L. & C. Mayers
Co. v. FTC, 97 Fad 365, 367 (2d Cir. 1938); FTC v. Real Prods. Corp., 90
F.ad 617 (2d Cir. 1937).
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has given rise to the opinion that "the requirement of public
interest imposes no substantial limitation on the Commission's
jurisdiction."' This conclusion and the cases lending support to
it seem erroneous.
Let us begin at the beginning, namely, Klesner. That case held,
if it held anything, that proof of consumer deception without more
does not satisfy the public-interest requirement' To be sure,
Klesner accorded the Commission "broad discretion" in making its
public-interest determination.' It indicated adequate public interest was present in a proceeding to prohibit an unfair method which
threatened the existence of competition, or involved flagrant
oppression of the weak by the strong, or tended to produce widespread injury that no private suit would be likely to redress?
But it also emphatically held that at least one "interest of the
community" -

"that private rights shall be respected" -

"is not

enough to support a finding of public interest." 20
The latter-day erosion of this position in the lower federal
courts has derived largely from emphasizing Klesner's grant of
discretion to the Commission at the expense of its caveat to that
discretion. Supreme Court decisions for the corresponding period
fail to justify this trend. FTC v. Raladam Co. reiterated the requirement that the public interest be "specific and substantial."-'
Similarly, FTC v. Royal Milling Co. stated, "It is true, as this
court held in Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, . . . that
mere misrepresentation and confusion on the part of purchasers
or even that they have been deceived is not enough."22 That the
Court there found the public-interest requirement satisfied is not
surprising, for the evidence showed that a large number of buyers
had been deceived into purchasing something they did not want
or intend to buy and apparently no countervailing economic
value in the practice was shown. The public interest was also
obviously present in FTC v. R. F. Keppel & Bros.," where the
practice involved, "break-and-take" candy packaging, was carried
on by 40 or more manufacturers, was the subject of many pending
cases, resulted in sales by the respondent of $234,000 per year,
16. Note, 56 CoLUM. L. Rav. 1018, 10-5 (1956).
17. See 280 U.S. at 27.
18. Id. at 28.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. 283 U.S. 648, 649 (1931).
22. 288 U.S. 212, 16 (1933).
28. 291 U.S. 304, 808-09 (1934).
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and had a significant effect on competing manufacturers, retailers, and consumers.
The point is that nothing in these cases required a retreat
from the standards erected in Klesner. Rather, even a strict construction of the public-interest clause would have permitted the
proceedings in these situations. Unless these later cases are so read
- as complementary to, rather than contradictory of, the Klesner
decision - the remarks of the Court in American Airlines, Inc. v.
North American Airlines, Inc.F are impossible to understand.

There the Court explained that it "has held that, under § 5, the
Federal Trade Commission may not employ its powers to vindicate private rights and that whether or not the facts, on complaint or as developed, show the public interest to be sufficiently
'specific and substantial' to authorize a proceeding by the Commission is a question subject to judicial review." The Court
cited Klesner, Keppel, and Royal Milling in support of these ob-

servations, apparently viewing the holdings as harmonious rather
than discordant.
Moreover, in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.," the

Court took pains to contrast the Sherman Act, into which Congress had already built a public-interest determination, with the
Federal Trade Commission Act, into which it had not. The Court
had noted in Standard Oil Co. v. United States2 7 that under the
Sherman Act, as to some restraints, "Congress had determined
its own criteria of public harm and it was not for the courts to
decide whether in an individual case injury had actually occurred."28 Then it added, "in this regard the Sherman Act should
be contrasted with § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act ...
which requires that the Commission find 'that a proceeding by
it .

.

. would be to the interest of the public' before it issues a

complaint for unfair competition."29
Therefore it seems clear beyond question that the Commission
is still required to find something more than an unfair method
of competition or a deceptive practice before it may enter an
order. That "something more" is a "specific and substantial" public interest.
24. 851 U.S. 79 (1956).
25. Id. at 83.
26. 859 U.S. 207 (1959).
27. 221 U.S. 1 (1910).
28. 859 U.S. at 211.
29. Id. at 211-12 n.4.
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IL.
One must take care, however, in formulating the problem, not
to put matters in the wrong order. After all, the object of section
5 is to authorize the Commission to stamp out unfair methods
of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce. The public interest would be thwarted, rather than furthered, if many of these practices were allowed to slip through a
public-interest-clause loophole in the Commission's net. The point
of Klesner is not that the Commission must make an exhaustive
showing of public interest in each case, but that it must not proceed in the face of evidence showing that public interest is lackingso In most instances Commission action against unfair competition and deceptive practices in commerce will further the interest
of the public. The policy of the statute dictates this conclusion.
Accordingly, the exceptions, not the rule, require elucidation. The
question is, under what circumstances may the public interest
better be served by finding a lack of public interest in a Commission proceeding than by the issuance or affirmance of an order.
Again we may commence our inquiry with Kleener. It has
been said that that case may be "put down as deciding that the
court may consider whether the controversy is not in general too
trivial to justify the attention of the Commission." 3 Though this
interpretation seems inadequate, for the moment let us accept it. Is
the triviality of a controversy a legitimate consideration in the
determination of the presence or absence of public interest in a
Commission proceeding?82 I think it is. True, the courts obviously
are not equipped to act appropriately as watchdogs over the
frivolous expenditure of Commission funds. Rather, justification
for the criterion of triviality exists because an FTC proceeding
80.
The specific facts established may show, as a matter of law, that the
proceeding which ... [the Commission] authorized is not in the public
interest, within the meaning of the Act. If this appears at any time
during the course of the proceeding before it, the Commission should
dismiss the complaint. If, instead, the Commission enters an order,
and later brings suit to enforce it, the court should, without inquiry
into the merits, dismiss the suit.
280 U.S. at 30.
81. Moretrench Corp. v. FTC, 127 F.2d 792, 795 (2d Cir. 1942).
32. The Klesner Court obviously thought so. Judge Friendly agrees. Ezposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F2d 869, 877 (2d Cir. 1961) (dissenting
opinion). For the contrary view see Judge Lumbard's opinion for the majority
in Exposition Press, supra at 873, and Judge Hand's opinion for the court
in Moretrench Corp. v. FTC, supra note 31.
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may work a hardship on a respondent entirely out of proportion
to his misdeed.
This result may come about in several ways. For one thing,
the great cost of actively defending against a Commission complaint"3 may force many a litigant to forego the luxury of an
adequate defense in minor controversies. 4 For another, although
the respondent's violation may be isolated, perhaps unique, and
not likely to be repeated, the order engendered is likely to be
broad in scope and permanent in duration, or there will be little
point in issuing any order at all. 5 In these cases of sporadic and
individual acts, "the Commission's powers are so defective that
they should be invoked only where no other remedy exists.""
This raises a second and related point. Clearly 1Vr. Justice
Brandeis' objection to the Commission proceeding in Klesner
was not merely that the subject matter was too trivial but that
the Commission was the wrong sort of forum in which to try the
controversy. He thought an essentially private dispute should be
tried in a court. 7 Similarly, before him, Henderson considered
customary passing-off cases, for example, subject to a faster and
more effective remedy in a court than through the "cumbersome
procedure" of the Commission. 3 The two themes, procedural
unsatisfactoriness and potential undue severity, coalesce in the
Fourth Circuit's opinion in Flynn & Emrich Co. v. FTC:39
The case here is rather a controversy of a private and personal
nature between the petitioner and the Perfection Company, and could
have been readily settled in the courts, and if a proper case were made
an injunction would have issued against the petitioner. Certainly Con33.
A competent lawyer is practically indispensable to someone dealing with
the Commission, and the legal fees involved even for negotiating a
settlement may exceed $25,000. Antitrust litigation before the Commission may cost each firm involved more than $175,000 per year in
legal fees, exclusive of the cost of the record.
Note, 62 Corms. L. REv. 671, 704 (1962).
34. "As it is, the cost and expense of travel and counsel are such that a
small respondent with limited means really cannot afford to defend a Federal
Trade Commission complaint." Howrey, The Federal Trade CommissionPresent Problems and Suggested Changes, 10 ABA SEcTIoN AwTrrauST L.
40, 46 (1957); see Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 Fd 869, 875 n.1 (2d
Cir. 1961) (dissenting opinion).
35. Compare the majority with the dissenting opinions in Gimbel Bros., 60
F.T.C. 359 (1962), and Quaker Oats Co., 60 F.T.C. 798 (1962).
36. HENDERSON, op. cit. supra note 7, at 232.
37. 280 U.S. at 28-30.
38. HENDERSON, op. cit. supra note 7, at 228.
39. 52 F.2d 836 (4th Cir. 1931).
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gress never intended that the machinery of the Federal Trade Commission, severe as its operation can be made, should be set in motion
for the settlement of private controversies, when the courts can act.
The official character of the Commission makes it all the more necessary
that it act only when the public interest is involved. It was never
intended that the Commission should act the part of a petty traffic
officer in the great highways of commerce.4 o

These observations seem sound not only for the reasons stated
but for others as well. Where the Commission intervenes in an
essentially private controversy, it effectively relieves one of the
prospective parties of the financial burden of the litigation and
presents the other party with an adversary of practically unlimited means. The public thus subsidizes some private litigants at
random to the detriment of others, and sometimes in the pursuit
of unmeritorious causes. Moreover, the course of the litigation
is distorted. What the Commission may see as an appropriate
remedy may well differ from what a court would have imposed
or what the private parties would have accepted in settlement.
Reversal of unduly severe Commission action is already an
accepted principle in a related context. A Commission order unnecessarily drastic in view of the offense may be modified to suit
the situation. For example, in the Royal Milling case the Commission order would have required the excision of the word "Milling" from respondents' trade names, since they did not in fact
mill grain. The Court stated:
[The trade names]... constitute valuable business assets in the nature of
good will, the destruction of which probably would be highly injurious
and should not be ordered if less drastic means will accomplish the
same result. The orders should go no further than is reasonably necessary to correct the evil and preserve the rights of competitors and the
public; and this can be done, in the respect under consideration, by
requiring proper qualifying words to be used in immediate connection
with the names. 1

Similarly, instances will arise, and have arisen, in which the
very commencement of a Commission proceeding is a sanction
of excessive magnitude in view of the triviality of the matter in
issue. Just as a stringent order may be undesirable, sometimes no
order is needed at all. Certainly this teaching is found in the numerous decisions involving abandonment of an unfair practice by a
respondent before an order is entered. It would, of course, be unsound to require the Commission to dismiss every such proceeding, for often "no assurance is in sight that petitioner, if it could
40. Id. at 838.
41. FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 217 (1933).
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shake [the Commission's] ... hand from its shoulder, would not
continue its former course."" All the same, the object of a Commission order is remedial rather than penal,. and with nothing
4 No
to remedy, an order is unwarranted."
one has recognized this
fact better than the Commission, and dismissals are frequent in
cases in which the allegedly unlawful practice has been discontinued."
Dismissal of a proceeding for lack of need of an order also is
appropriate in other situations. The same result may obtain when
the danger of significant public injury seems slight. Thus, the
court in Burton-Dixvie Corp. v. FTC4 saw no need for an order
to protect consumers from confusing items as to which, the evidence indicated, they had no preference and no basis for a preference. In S. Buchsbaum & Co. v. FTC,'7 a Commission order prohibiting the use of the tradename "Elasti-Glass" and the word
"glass" to describe articles made of synthetic resins was reversed
because nothing in the findings showed any deception having a
tendency to result in detriment to the purchasing public.4
In Arnold Stone Co. v. FTC;9 petitioner's "cast stone" was
sold primarily to architects, contractors, and builders, who knew
it was manufactured rather than natural. The chance that some
unsophisticated buyer might sometime be deceived was considered so remote that public interest was deemed lacking. The
Commission's own recent decision in Heinz W. Kirchnero supports the correctness of this approach. There the advertising
42. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 Fed. 307, 310,(7th Cir. 1919).
43. See, e.g., FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952); Niresk Indus.,
Inc. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 387, 343 (7th Cir. 1960).
44. E.g., Stokely-Van Camp, Inc. v. FTC, 246 F.ed 458 (7th Cir. 1957).
45. See United States Rubber Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1964 Trade Cas.)
17006 (FTC July 31, 1964); Chesebrough-Ponds, Inc., TRADE REG. REP.
(1964 Trade Cas.) 17007 (FTC July 27, 1964); Oneida, Ltd., 55 F.T.C. 1669
(1959); R. H. White Corp., 54 F.T.C. 1734 (1958); Phillip Morris & Co., 51
F.T.C. 857 (1955); Argus Cameras, Inc., 51 F.T.C. 405 (1954); Harrison Mills,
Inc., 50 F.T.C. 1044 (1954); Denver Chem. Mfg. Co., 50 F.T.C. 837 (1954);
Wildroot Co., 49 F.T.C. 1578 (1953); Hollywood Athletic Co., 44 F.T.C. 1234
(1948).
46. 240 F.2d 166, 174-75 (7th Cir. 1957).
47. 160 F.2d 121 (7th Cir. 1947).
48. The Commission acquiesced in the Buchsbaum decision by dismissing
a battery of cases on its authority. Saks & Co., 44 F.T.C. 1142 (1948); Hickok
Mfg. Co., 44 F.T.C. 1145 (1948); Pioneer Suspender Co., 44 F.T.C. 1145
(1948); A. Stein & Co., 44 F.T.C. 1146 (1948); Rohm & Haas Co., 44 F.T.C.
1147 (1948).
49. 49 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1981).
50. 3 TRADE REG. REP. 16664 (FTC Nov. 7, 1963).
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claim was that a "Swim-Ezy" device to aid the beginning swimmer was "invisible" when worn. The Commission stated, "The
possibility that some persons might believe that 'Swim-Ezy' is,
not merely inconspicuous, but wholly invisible or bodiless, seems
to us too far-fetched to warrant this Commission's intervention
in the public interest.""'
Thoroughgoing support for the dismissal of a proceeding, when
there is slender likelihood of public injury and other considerations countervail, is provided by the Commission's opinion
in Modern Methods, Inc.52 There, in dismissing the complaint for
lack of a fair hearing, the Commission stated:
We conclude, therefore, that the complaint in this proceeding should
be dismissed. The Commission unquestionably has the power to remand
this matter to a hearing examiner for further evidence in order to provide an adequate basis for review. However, such a proceeding is costly,
time consuming and, to some extent, harassing to respondents. The
record is devoid of the testimony of dissatisfied customers claiming
deception on the part of respondents. Even though proof of actual
deception is not prerequisite to a finding of violation, taking into consideration all the circumstances disclosed by this record we are satisfied
that the public interest will be adequately protected by continuing a
close scrutiny of respondents' operations.53

An even stronger case for withholding Commission action

would seem to exist when the Commission proceeding is not only
unlikely to redress any public injury but may actually work such
injury itself. This is not a farfetched possibility. In Standard Oil
Co. v. FTC, 4 gasoline refiners were furnishing retailers with
pumps and tanks free of charge or at less than cost on the condition that the retailer agree to dispense only the donor-refiner's
gasoline from the gift facilities. The petitioner argued a lack of
public interest and the court agreed. Apparently the practice had
not increased but decreased the cost of distribution, and its
prevention would have decreased the number of filling stations
and increased the price of gasoline.
In John Bene & Sons v. FTC," the Commission had found that
the respondent falsely disparaged a competitive product. However,
the disparaged product was found by the reviewing court to have
been misbranded, in that its label stated a medical use for which
the product was unfit. The court also found evidence that a deci51. Id. at 21540.
59. 60 F.T.C. 309 (1962).
53. Id. at 341. (Emphasis added.)
54. 282 Fed. 81 (3d Cir. 1922), af'd sub nom. FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co.,
261 U.S. 463 (1923).
55. 299 Fed. 468 (2d Cir. 1924).
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sion in the Commission's favor would restore public faith in the
mislabeled product. The court, therefore, saw no public interest
in upholding the Commission order.
The Commission's remarkable recent decisions in Max Factor
& Co." and Shulton, Inc. reveal yet another set of reasons for
finding an absence of public interest in a proceeding. In these
cases the respondents were charged with violating Section 2(d)
of the Robinson-Patman Act by granting disproportionate advertising and promotional allowances to a single supermarket chain.
The Commission dismissed the complaints without inquiry into
the merits. It observed that the factual pattern was a familiar
one, i.e., a large buyer soliciting an allowance from its suppliers
for a special promotion and the suppliers faced with the necessity
of complying to avoid a serious competitive disadvantage. In such
a situation, the Commission reasoned, the policy of the statute
is better served by proceeding against the offending buyer under
section 5.
Accordingly, the Commission, in the exercise of its administrative
responsibility to determine what enforcement policy, in the circumstances, is "best calculated to achieve the ends contemplated by Congress," has decided to dismiss the complaints in the present cases. The
respondents are only two among a very large number of suppliers who
participated in Weingarten's special promotional events during the
period in question. The entry of cease-and-desist orders against these
particularrespondents, therefore, would not be an equitable and fully
effective method of eliminating the discriminatory practices in which
respondents engaged, along with,many others, and would not be in the
public interest.58

The result is particularly striking in view of the apparent absence
of a public-interest limitation on Commission jurisdiction under
the Robinson-Patman Act. 9

IV.
Thus, the substantial significance that the public-interest concept continues to have for the future of FTC proceedings is apparent. Whether or not, and even if, a deceptive practice or unfair
method of competition in commerce is found to exist, it is still
56. TRADE :REG. REP. (1964 Trade Cas.) 16992 (FTC July 22, 1964).
57. Ibid.
58. Id. at 22066. (Emphasis added.) Nestle-Lemur Co., TRADE REG. REP.
(1964 Trade Cas.)
16995 (FTC Aug. 10, 1964), and Lanolin Plus, Inc.,
TRADE REG. REP. (1964 Trade Cas.)
16995 (FTC Aug. 10, 1964), were subsequently dismissed on the same grounds.
59. Webb-Crawford Co. v. FTC, 109 F.2d 268, 269 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
810 U.S. 638 (1940).
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appropriate to consider dismissal of the proceeding for lack of
public interest. Public interest is not served if an order would be
ineffective or unfair, or the intervention of a public agency is
undesirable, or the burden of a proceeding and order on the respondent are unduly severe, or the proceeding is unwarranted
in view of the unlikelihood of public injury, or an order might
affect the economy adversely rather than favorably, and so on.
Regard for these considerations is of fundamental importance,
for they provide essential balance to the Commission's enforcement program. Without the public-interest proviso, the Commission's endeavors could be carried to uncritical, oppressive, even
anticompetitive, extremes. In the false advertising field, for example, it is now axiomatic that the Commission may insist "upon
a form of advertising clear enough so that, in the words of the
prophet Isaiah, 'wayfaring men, though fools, shall not err therein."60 The exercise of such power in every trifling instance of
possible consumer confusion could be unjustifiably stifling. In
several types of cases it seems that it already has been.
Let us consider, first, the predicament of the re-refiners of
automotive lubricating oil. These concerns acquire used motor
oil, refine out the impurities, and sell the oil in competition with
oil produced from virgin crude. Re-refined oil has been found as
satisfactory for lubricating purposes as new oil.61 Nonetheless,
consumers prefer new to re-refined oil, and both the Commission
and the courts have held that re-refined oil must be prominently
labeled as such to give the buyer an opportunity to refuse it.
This result has been challenged on the grounds that 1) the public
is not prejudiced by the unknowing purchase of re-refined oil,
2) the requisite disclosure injures competition by placing rerefiners at a serious disadvantage vis-a-vis competing refiners,
and 3) the assistance rendered the consumer in indulging his
capricious prejudice against re-refined oil results in the unnecessary waste of a precious natural resource." These arguments
have been blandly dismissed in a manner that seems totally unsatisfactory.3 If they were founded in fact, they so clearly outweighed the inconsequential deception involved, that dismissal of
60. General Motors Corp. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 33, 86 (2d Cir. 1940).
61. Mohawk Ref. Corp. v. FTC, 268 F.2d 818, 821 (3d Cir. 1959).
62. See the court's discussion of the arguments of the petitioner in Kerran
v. FTC, 265 F.2d 246, 248-49 (10th Cir. 1959).
63. See Kerran v. FTC, 265 F.2d 246 (10th Cir. 1959); Mohawk Ref. Corp.
v. FTC, 263 F.d 818 (3d Cir. 1959).
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the proceeding in the public interest was not merely proper but
imperative."
A less clear, but provocative, public-interest problem is posed
by the so-called "skip-trace" cases. These involve the use of varyingly deceptive devices for finding people who are evading their
creditors. The tracing agency may, for example, write, under a
fictitious name, to a relative of the debtor or to his last known
address, stating that it is holding a package for the debtor which
it will forward to him if his address is supplied. The courts have
flatly rejected the argument that the tendency of this practice
to aid in ascertaining the whereabouts of delinquent debtors
deprives the proceeding of public interest." The correct resolution of the issue is less obvious. If evidence were introduced to
show that bad-debt losses were a serious burden to the economy
and that skip-tracers were instrumental in reducing this burden
significantly, a finding of no public interest in preventing the
practice would not seem unreasonable. At the least, the publicinterest question deserves more serious consideration in these
cases.
V.
In sum, a danger exists that the Federal Trade Commission
Act may be invoked in unworthy causes if the public-interest
requirement is neglected. So far-reaching a statute simply cannot
be construed to make every possible violation a per se offense.
As with other antitrust laws of comprehensive scope and indefinite terminology, its application must be informed by a "rule of
reason" or the consequences would be intolerable. 6 The public64. However, the Commission still refuses to accord any public-interest
significance to these considerations. See the FTC trade regulation rule on
Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Previously Used Lubricating Oil, 9
Fed. Reg. 11650 (adopted July 28, 1964, effective Jan. 1, 1965).
65. E.g., National Clearance Bureau v. FTC, 255 F.2d 102, 103 (3d Cir.

1958); Rothschild v. FTC, 200 F.2d 89, 42 (7th Cir. 1952); Silverman v. FTC,
145 F.ad 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1944).

66. It has been suggested that a "rule of reason" be read into the act
by making public injury a necessary element of an unfair method of competition. Note, 43 HARv. L. REv. 285, 287-88 (1929). This seems less satisfactory
than reliance on the public-interest clause. A practice may be deceptive within
the meaning of the statute and yet not be an appropriate object of Commission action because public interest is lacking. The absence of public interest
does not make the practice less deceptive, but it does make its prohibition
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interest clause seems to have served implicitly in this role in the
past. It has saved the statute - albeit less frequently than one
would have wished - from an inflexibility which would have
offended against common sense, procedural fairness, sound economics, and even the antitrust policy which the act was designed
to promote. It must continue to serve in this capacity if the
Commission is "to do what it ... [has] been created to do, to get
on with 'the great purpose of the act.' ""
by the Commission undesirable. A "rule of reason" is not needed here to
help define "deceptive practice" or "unfair method of competition," but to
help determine whether or not such practices and methods should be put to
an end.
67. Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295 F.2d 869, 877 (2d Cir. 1961)
(Friendly, J., dissenting, quoting in part from FTC v. Raladam Co., 288
U.S. 643, 650 (1931)). Of course, the Commission should continue, as the
Klemser case points out, to have considerable discretion in determining
whether or not there is public interest in a proceeding. But when one factor
after another indicates its absence-as, for example, seems to have been
true in the re-refined motor oil cases, see text accompanying notes 61-64 upra
-judicial reversal is not only appropriate but essential to sound enforcement
of the statute.

